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Abstract
South Korea was once a typical high birth country. However, Korea is facing serious
low birth rates recently as the total fertility rate is 0.98, which means that the Korean couple
has less than one child on average. The rapid demographic change due to low fertility causes
many negative effects such as economic vitality and welfare burden. Thus, the Korean
governments have introduced various policies to overcome the low birth rate, and one of these
is the childbirth grant policy: governments provide a certain amount of cash when a family
within its jurisdiction gives birth. However, the world's lowest fertility rates of Korea seldom
show signs of rising. So, the problem statement is whether the birth grants policy is effective
in increasing childbirth in Korea. The independent variable is the childbirth grant policy, and
the dependent variable is the fertility rate and the number of births. Control variables affecting
their relationship are classified into economic factors such as income level, childcare facilities,
and medical facilities, and social and demographic factors such as divorce rate, marriage rate,
the age of first marriage, and elderly population. I used panel data regression. The panels are
25 autonomous districts in Seoul Metropolitan City from 2015 to 2018. Using these panels, I
estimated the effects of childbirth incentives on birth rate have differed over the period. As a
result of the estimation, the coefficients of childbirth grants are negative on both the total
fertility rate and the number of childbirths statistically significant. The results are contrary to
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general prediction that the fertility rate will increase if there is a large amount of childbirth
subsidies. However, in reality, it is the opposite causal relationship: the birth rate is reversecausing the grant. The childbirth grants cannot affect people’s birth decision; rather, the
district's low fertility rate makes local governments spend more childbirth grants. It can be
interpreted that policy makers are aware of the region's low birth rate and then have increased
the amount of childbirth subsidies to increase the rate. Among the control variables, social and
demographic factors are found to have a major impact on the dependent variables: the elderly
population ratio and average first marriage age affect dependent variables in the direction of
negative, while the marriage rate has a positive impact. However, the economic factors are
statistically insignificant, and do not affect childbirth. Fundamentally, if people desire to have
children, they are doing that, by getting married, possibly at younger ages. Only a change in
people’s goals, or much more money than is currently allocated, would have the intended
effect. However, this paper has limitations; first, local areas have large effects (high rho values
in the estimation), so there is a limit to generalizing the results on a nationwide because there
are considerable fixed effects for each autonomous district; second, there was a limit to collect
relevant data when there were countless factors affecting childbirth decisions, which can be a
factor that undermines the internal validity of the variables; and the last is the limits of the data,
which may be problems with accurate estimates because it was analyzed based on only four
years of data.

1. Introduction: Discussion of the Issue
South Korea was a typical high birth country. Just half a century ago, the nation
launched a campaign called “Let's have one and grow well.” However, Korea is facing serious
low birth rates recently. According to data released by Korea National Statistical Office in
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2019, the total fertility rate is 0.98. It means that the Korean couple has less than one child on
average.
Figure 1: Trend of total fertility rate and number of birth in Korea

(source: Korea National Statistical Office and https://news.joins.com/article/23564940)

The rapid demographic change due to low fertility is expected to have a ripple effect
on major policies such as jobs, welfare, pensions, education, and housing. As the productive
population decreases, economic vitality decreases, and the welfare burden of the aging
population is snowballing. It can adversely affect economic growth, domestic demand, and
employment. Also, one research results show that no one will live in more than 80 counties by
2050, which accounts for 35% of them in Korea because the total population will decrease
from 2029 due to ultra-low fertility (Yoo, 2018). If this trend continues, it is clear that there
will be many areas with only administrative districts and no people.
The causes of low fertility in Korea are analyzed as follows: the reduction of the female
population of childbearing age, avoidance of childbearing among younger Koreans, the
deterioration of socioeconomic conditions such as employment and housing affecting
marriage, the increase in unemployment among the youth, and the difficulty of working and
raising children at the same time. Accordingly, the Korean governments have introduced and
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promoted various policies to overcome the low birth rate such as subsidy for daycare cost, tax
benefits, supply of public daycare facilities, and maternity childcare leave.
Among these policies, the debate on childbirth grant policy is hot. In general, when it
comes to childbirth grants in Korea, it refers to cash aid. For example, local governments
provide a certain amount of cash when a family within its jurisdiction gives birth to a first child.
And grants are also provided for the birth of the second and third children, and from the fourth
child, the amounts of grant are raised to induce more childbearing. There are many places that
give big money more than $1,000 by raising childbirth grants competitively and some localities
experienced an actual increase in fertility rates.
However, the world's lowest fertility rates of Korea seldom show signs of rising. In
addition, there is skepticism about the grant policy. Many young couples believe that the
amount of incentives is not important, but that they would be able to think of childbirth only
when they have a well-parenting environment. Also, with the emergence of large childbirth
grants, the controversy over taking money and leaving for other areas is growing. It is likely
that the recipients had moved into camouflage for childbirth subsidies.

2. Problem Statement and Hypothesis
Therefore, my problem statement is whether birth grants policy can affect people's
childbirth decisions. To be specific, is the birth grants policy effective in increasing childbirth?
The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis of the study are as follows.
• Ho: The childbirth grant policy does not cause an increase in birth rates.
• H1: The childbirth grant policy causes an increase in birth rates.
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3. Literature Review
Through a review of the existing literature, I want to find out what is the theoretical
background of the childbirth grants policy, and what factors influence childbirth in addition to
this policy.
1) Childbirth grants policy
When it comes to childbirth grants, they refer to cash aid or subsidy for childbirth.
According to Willis (1973), the childbirth grant is a policy that artificially increases the income
of households, offsetting factors that play a negative role in the fertility decision-making,
thereby raising the birth rate. However, this view has been criticized for considering income as
the only opportunity cost for child-rearing (Ermisch, 1980).
To counter this criticism, Easterlin (1973) argued for “the theory of relative income”,
and he argued childbirth was determined not by absolute income but by relative income levels
by comparisons with similar groups. Leibenstein (1975) also found that people's preferences
for the birth rate vary by group and class. According to his study, the lower the relative
advantage over average income compared to the reference group, the lower the impact of
income on the birth rate.
2) Childbirth
Regarding childbirth, economic and demographic factors are believed to interact and
affect each other. Concerning the impact of economic factors on the birth rate, Heo and Lee
(2011) found that the expansion of childcare facilities had a positive effect on childbirth by
reducing the burden of women's childcare and decreasing the opportunity cost of childbirth in
Korea. And the increase in women's and family income also showed a positive impact on the
birth rate, and the higher the income is, the more positive the birth rate is.
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Social and demographic factors are variables related to the characteristics and values
of women’s perception. Choi and Song (2010) analyze that the higher the divorce rate, the more
limited the opportunity of women to give birth would be. Divorced women generally have a
lower birth rate, as their expectations and prudence for marriage tend to increase. Gustafsson,
Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2002) believe that early marriage increases the birth rate by extending
the time during which births are likely, and Macdonald's research shows that early marriage
also has a positive impact on women's view of childbirth (Macdonald, 1999).
3) Research methods and results
Milligan (2005) analyzed the effect of the ANC (Active Neighborhood Canada)
program, which is a childbirth subsidy support policy implemented in Quebec, Canada. It was
identified as having a positive effect on the childbirth. Drago et al. (2009) also evaluated the
effect of the Australian birth incentive program, called the Baby Bonus, on the fertility rate.
Although the birth incentives had a positive effect on the increase in the fertility rate, they
found that the effect of the funding was not large.
As studies in Korea, first, Heo and Lee (2011) examined the change in fertility rates
after the introduction of the childbirth grants policy, using data from 164 local governments. It
was emphasized that the policy effect needs to be approached from a long-term perspective, as
the effect of the childbirth grants policy appeared from the point of time after 4 years, not a
short period. Second, Song and Kim (2014) examined the impact of the childbirth subsidy
policy on the fertility rate in local governments across the country. The policy had a positive
effect on the behavioral patterns of the population moving to regions with high childbirth
grants. Lastly, Seok (2011) investigated the effect of the childbirth policies of 155 local
governments nationwide on the fertility rate from 2008 to 2010 and interpreted that the
subsidies did not significantly affect the fertility rate.
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4) Implications
Using the literature review, I can confirm childbirth grants are based on the theory that
childbirth decisions are made at the individual level when income is relatively superior to the
opportunity cost of childbirth. In addition to this grant, various economic and demographic
variables affecting childbirth were also identified. Also, in many studies, childbirth grants have
had a positive effect on childbirth, but some studies found that there was little effect.
As a design of the research, existing literature in Korea included studies on more than
100 local government grant policies. However, since there are many differences in the
composition of the population, income level, and industrial structure of these local
governments, I can say that there is a limit to measuring the same effect of the grant policy on
childbirth under this condition. In other words, it may be difficult to control the impact of
variables other than grants on childbirth. In addition, most researchers have studied the effect
of the grant policy over a short term period.
Therefore, I think it is better to design the research to measure the effect of the
childbirth grants policy over a longer period of time and to focus on homogeneous groups
within the Korean population.

4. Research Method
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the childbirth grant policy in Korea
has affected the birth rate. Therefore, the dependent variable is fertility rate and the independent
variable is the childbirth grant policy.
Before describing the variables, the spatial scope of the paper is Seoul Metropolitan
City which has the lowest birth rate among the 17 metropolitan governments in South Korea.
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My analysis targets 25 autonomous districts in Seoul because they are all self-governing
municipalities included in the same living area of Seoul. In addition, since the resources of the
childbirth grants are determined according to the financial capacity of each municipality, they
can clearly show the difference of the effect by the policy.
Thus, I will use panel data regression. The panels are 25 autonomous districts in Seoul
Metropolitan City and their data will be used. Using these panels, I estimate the effects of
childbirth incentives on birth rate having differed over the period.
1) Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are the total fertility rate of 25 autonomous districts belonging
to the Seoul Metropolitan City from 2015 to 2018 and the number of babies born per thousand
people. The total fertility rate is an indicator of the average number of babies a woman is
expected to have for a lifetime, and it is the sum of the birth rates by age. However, since the
total fertility rate itself is the sum of the mother's birth rate by age, the high total fertility rate
does not necessarily increase the number of births (Heo and Lee, 2011), so the actual birth
number of each district will be additionally selected and analyzed as a dependent variable.
2) Independent Variables
The independent variable is the childbirth grants for each autonomous region. The
difference in the relative level of the payment of childbirth can be interpreted that the district
has paid more incentives to policy recipients than neighboring districts pay. Those subject to
childbirth will feel this relative difference, which will serve as a crucial factor in deciding
whether to give birth.
For calculating relative grants, the weighted average of the total amount of grants paid
by 25 autonomous districts will be utilized in consideration of the order of birth. Since these
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grants are basically self-imposed by municipal ordinances, the amount, payment methods, and
the eligibility for support vary from district to district. For example, there are some districts
that provide incentives from the birth of the first child, while others give subsidies from the
birth of the second. Therefore, the weighted average of the birth order from the first to the fifth
childbirths will be used to calculate the childbirth grants for each municipality. This will be
introduced in detail in the following “5. Data” chapter.
3) Controls
A control variable is an element which is constant throughout the research. It is
important to set controls to minimize the effects of variables other than independent variables.
Thus, an analysis will be conducted including control variables that can affect the relationship
between independent and dependent variables. The controls are divided into economic factors
and social and demographic factors.
In this paper, economic factors are applied by selecting the income level, number of
childcare facilities, and number of medical facilities for each district as variables. The social
and demographic factors related to women's individual values are the divorce rate of women,
the marriage rate, the average age of first marriage by women, and the level of elderly
population by district.

5. Data
1) Dependent Variables
Data on the total fertility rate and the number of births, the dependent variables, can
be obtained through the Korea National Statistical Office web site (www.kosis.kr). The total
fertility rate is based on the census data conducted annually by the Statistical Office. And,
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because the population level of each district is different, the total number of births will be
divided by each total population to measure a birth rate.
2) Independent Variables
The independent variable, the childbirth grants, can be obtained by referring to “the
document of childbirth grants in 25 municipalities” submitted by the Seoul Metropolitan
Government to the National Assembly in 2019. In addition, the specific details and amount of
the local government's childbirth grants can be confirmed through the ordinance of each
institution. Ordinances related to the municipal government's childbirth grants are in the
“Autonomous Law Information System” (https://www.elis.go.kr).
By weighting the grants according to birth order rather than the sum of simple grants,
a method to compare the grants of local governments more objectively was utilized. For the
method of assigning weighted averages for each birth order, refer to the previous study (Choi
and Song, 2010). The weighted average of each birth order will be calculated as follows: Xn is
the grant amount for childbirth order; Wn is the weight for Xn; the weight of each birth order
will be set to increase by 10; and local governments in Seoul are giving the childbirth grants
up to 5 children.
• Weighted Average

=

W1∗X1+W2∗X2+⋯+Wn∗Xn
W1+W2+⋯+Wn

=

10∗grant for 1st baby+20∗2nd+30∗3rd+40∗4th+50∗5th
150

3) Controls
As economic controls, the income level data for each autonomous district will be
calculated by dividing the total gross regional domestic product by the total population. The
childcare and medical environment will be calculated by dividing the number of childcare and
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medical facilities by the total population of each region. These data can be obtained through
the National Statistical Office and Seoul Open Data Forum (www.data.seoul.go.kr).
As the social and demographic factors, the divorce rate is the proportion of divorced
women divided by the number of women in each region, and the population aging rate is the
proportion of people over 65 divided by the total regional population. The marriage rate and
average age of first marriage in each district can be obtained using the census of the National
Statistical Office and data from Seoul Open Data Forum.
Variables and related data yield formulas are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Definition and source of variables
Variable

Total Fertility Rate

Formula

Source

-

KOSIS

Dependent
Number of Childbirth
Independent

Childbirth Grant
Income Level

Economic

Childcare Facility
Medical Facility

Controls

Divorce Rate

Marriage Rate
Social and
Demographic
Age of First Marriage
Aging Population Rate

Sum of Birth
Total Population

× 1000

KOSIS

W1 ∗ X1 + W2 ∗ X2 + ⋯ + W5 ∗ X5
W1 + W2 + ⋯ + W5

Seoul Open Data
Forum

GRDP
Total Population

KOSIS & Seoul
Open Data Forum

Sum of Childcare Facility

× 1000

Total Population
Sum of Medical Facility
Total Population

× 1000

Sum of Divorce Women
Total Women Population

× 1000

Sum of Marriage Number
Total Population

× 1000

Total Population

KOSIS & Seoul
Open Data Forum
KOSIS & Seoul
Open Data Forum
KOSIS & Seoul
Open Data Forum
Seoul Open Data
Forum

Sum of Population over 65

KOSIS & Seoul
Open Data Forum

× 1000

KOSIS

Lee 12

6. Estimation
The variables are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary statistics

Variable

Observation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Total fertility rate

100

0.8824

0.1234

0.597

1.169

Number of birth

100

7.0212

1.2761

4.2073

10.0854

Childbirth grant

100

10.8487

7.1922

2.8667

36.7333

Income level

100

43.2746

68.4517

6.1149

349.6283

Childcare facility

100

0.6658

0.2937

0.1018

2.3074

Medical facility

100

1.7859

0.9187

1.0022

4.8289

Divorce rate

100

3.6318

0.5533

2.5269

5.0237

Marriage rate

100

5.834

.9757

4.1

8.4

Age of first marriage

100

31.104

.3342

30.2

31.9

Elderly people rate

100

13.87

1.8312

10.3

18.2

There are six tables of regression results. Tables 3 and 4 include the childbirth grants
and economic variables, Tables 5 and 6 include the childbirth grants and social and economic
variables, and Tables 7 and 8 include the childbirth grant and all other variables.
1) Applying economic factors as controls
First, panel data analysis was performed by setting economic factors as control
variables. The p-value is larger than the common α level of 0.05, which indicates that the effect
of childbirth grants on the total fertility rate is not statistically significant. However, If the α
level is slightly relaxed to 0.10, it can be interpreted as statistically significant. The same result
is produced when the number of births is set as a dependent variable.
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Table 3 Estimation of total fertility rate with economic controls
Sample of 100 (25 districts by 4 years), overall test of the model F(4, 71) = 22.23, p<0.0001, overall test of fixed
effects F(24, 71) = 6.55, p<0.0001, fraction of variance accounted for by 25 district fixed effects 99.4%.

Independent variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t-stat

p-value

Childbirth grant

-0.0046

0.0026

-1.80

0.076

Income level

0.0035

0.0032

1.09

0.280

Childcare facility

0.0396

0.0310

1.28

0.205

Medical facility

-1.2209

0.1869

-6.53

<0.001

Constant

2.9355

0.2519

11.65

<0.001

Table 4 Estimation of number of birth with economic controls
Sample of 100 (25 districts by 4 years), overall test of the model F(4, 71) = 23.20, p<0.0001, overall test of fixed
effects F(24, 71) = 10.05, p<0.0001, fraction of variance accounted for by 25 district fixed effects 99.2%.

Independent variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t-stat

p-value

Childbirth grant

-0.0043

0.0024

-1.79

0.078

Income level

0.0410

0.0301

1.36

0.177

Childcare facility

0.2979

0.2902

1.03

0.308

Medical facility

-12.1023

1.7510

-6.91

<0.001

Constant

27.1296

2.3595

11.50

<0.001

2) Applying social and demographic factors as controls
The following are the results of the analysis by adding social and demographic
controls. The effects of some independent variables are statistically significant (p < 0.05);
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however, the sign of coefficient of childbirth grant is negative to the total fertility rate and the
number of childbirths, and the magnitude of that coefficient is 0.0027 and 0.0023 each.
Table 5 Estimation of total fertility rate with social and demographic controls
Sample of 100 (25 districts by 4 years), overall test of the model F(5, 70) = 236.49, p<0.0001, overall test of fixed
effects F(24, 70) = 37.25, p<0.0001, fraction of variance accounted for by 25 district fixed effects 96.7%.

Independent variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t-stat

p-value

Childbirth grant

-0.0027

0.0087

-3.09

0.003

Divorce rate

0.0484

0.0245

1.98

0.052

Marriage rate

0.0339

0.0102

3.34

0.001

Age of first marriage

-0.0419

0.0232

-1.81

0.075

Elderly people rate

-0.0919

0.0079

-11.70

<0.001

Constant

3.1182

0.6968

4.48

<0.001

Table 6 Estimation of number of birth with social and demographic controls
Sample of 100 (25 districts by 4 years), overall test of the model F(5, 70) = 286.87, p<0.0001, overall test of fixed
effects F(24, 70) = 25.64, p<0.0001, fraction of variance accounted for by 25 district fixed effects 94.8%.

Independent variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t-stat

p-value

Childbirth grant

-0.0023

0.0076

-3.03

0.003

Divorce rate

0.4854

0.2118

2.29

0.025

Marriage rate

0.4519

0.0880

5.13

<0.001

Age of first marriage

-0.5161

0.2.008

-2.57

0.012

Elderly people rate

-0.7709

0.0680

-11.34

<0.001

Constant

29.6159

6.0263

4.91

<0.001
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3) Applying all controls
The followings are the results of panel data analysis, including all controls. First, in
the fertility rate, the sign of coefficient of childbirth grant is negative to total fertility rate, and
the magnitude is about 0.0021. The confidence level from -3.94 to -1.88 has 95% probability
of including true value of coefficient of childbirth grant. The p-value is smaller than the
common α level of 0.05, which indicates that it is statistically significant.
Table 7 Estimation of total fertility rate with all controls
Sample of 100 (25 districts by 4 years), overall test of the model F(8, 67) = 151.14, p<0.0001, overall test of fixed
effects F(24, 67) = 33.20, p<0.0001, fraction of variance accounted for by 25 district fixed effects 98.0%.

Independent variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t-stat

p-value

Childbirth grant

-0.0021

0.0094

-2.20

0.032

Income level

-0.0017

0.0012

-1.42

0.161

Childcare facility

0.0128

0.0114

1.12

0.266

Medical facility

0.0861

0.0886

0.97

0.335

Divorce rate

0.0553

0.0245

2.26

0.027

Marriage rate

0.0357

0.0104

3.44

0.001

Age of first marriage

-0.0400

0.0233

-1.72

0.090

Elderly people rate

-0.0924

0.0083

-11.07

<0.001

Constant

2.9319

0.6999

4.19

<0.001

In the second dependent variable, the sign of coefficient of childbirth grant is also
negative to the number of births and magnitude is 0.0020. The confidence level from -3.66 to
-3.41 in childbirth numbers has 95% probability of including true value of coefficient of
childbirth grant. It is statistically significant because the p-value is 0.02 (p<0.05).
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Table 8 Estimation of number of birth with all controls
Sample of 100 (25 districts by 4 years), overall test of the model F(8, 67) = 174.64, p<0.0001, overall test of fixed
effects F(24, 67) = 24.18, p<0.0001, fraction of variance accounted for by 25 district fixed effects 95.8%.

Independent variable

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t-stat

p-value

Childbirth grant

-0.0020

0.0083

-2.41

0.019

Income level

-0.0055

0.0103

-0.53

0.597

Childcare facility

0.0757

0.1013

0.75

0.458

Medical facility

0.1510

0.7843

0.19

0.848

Divorce rate

0.5157

0.2171

5.02

0.020

Marriage rate

0.4609

0.9187

5.02

<0.001

Age of first marriage

-0.4978

0.2060

-2.42

0.018

Elderly people rate

-0.7644

0.0739

-10.35

<0.001

Constant

28.6818

6.1946

4.63

<0.001

Analyzing the effects of the controls, the economic factors, income levels, childcare
facilities, and medical facilities are not statistically significant, with the p-values all greater
than 0.05. On the other hand, social and demographic factors all show statistically significant
results, and based on the size of the coefficient values, they have a greater effect on the
dependent variables in the order of the elderly population ratio, average first marriage age, and
marriage rate.
The “rho” values which represent the fraction of the error due to the fixed characteristic
of the district in the overall error, are 0.98 in total fertility rate and 0.96 in the number of
childbirths. The higher the rho is, the higher the influence of the characteristics of the panel
variable on the dependent variable would be. This is also confirmed by F test. Since the p-
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values are less than 0.05, they are statistically significant. Also, because the both F values
(33.20 and 24.18) are greater than the critical value of the F-distribution table, the hypothesis
that panel data variable, the district, has no effect can be rejected. This means that there is a
fixed effect of the district. Therefore, due to high rho values and results of F test in this case,
we should consider the effect of average fixed and unique characteristics of each district on
total fertility rate and the number of childbirths.

7. Policy Implications
As a result of the estimation, the coefficients of childbirth grants are negative on both
the total fertility rate and the number of childbirths statistically significant. Moreover,
considering the coefficients, childbirth grants are associated with both dependent variables.
Therefore, the null hypothesis that childbirth grants will not affect the increase in birth rates is
rejected, but the results do not support the alternative hypothesis.
My conclusion through this statistical estimation is that the relationship between
childbirth grants and birth rates is reverse causation. In common sense, it is possible to predict
that the fertility rate will increase if there is a large amount of childbirth subsidies, but in reality,
it is the opposite causal relationship: the birth rate is reverse-causing the grant. The childbirth
grants cannot affect people’s birth decision; rather, the district's low fertility rate makes local
governments spend more childbirth grants.
It is necessary to note why this policy is being implemented in all 25 municipalities
despite the fact that there is no evidence of the desired effect of the policy. Childbirth grants
policy could be seen as an alternative by local government considering political demands for
resolution of the low birthrate. It can be interpreted that policy makers are aware of the region's
low birth rate and then have increased the amount of childbirth subsidies to increase the rate.

Lee 18

Thus, rather than being based on an analysis of the effectiveness of the subsidy, the grants
policies were introduced with the vague expectation that people's perceptions and behavior
about childbirth will change if the government provides subsidies and were much considered
political aspects like providing favorable benefits to voters.
Among the control variables, social and demographic factors are found to have a major
impact on the dependent variables. Specifically, the elderly population ratio and average first
marriage age affect dependent variables in the direction of negative, while the marriage rate
has a positive impact. As literature reviews, it could be confirmed that the more elderly people
and the higher the age of first marriage, the more negatively affects childbirth and avoid giving
birth. People desiring to have children are getting married, possibly at an earlier age.
However, income levels, childcare facilities, and medical facilities in each district,
which are economic factors, are statistically insignificant, and do not affect childbirth. This
means that people do not decide to give birth based on the opportunity cost of giving birth, or
it can be interpreted that these facilities are not considered as significant variables because they
do not rise to a level sufficient to change decisions of policy recipients.
In conclusion, it is necessary to reconsider the childbirth grants policy. The solution to
raising the birthrate needs more effective measures than temporary cash aid considering
political interests. A more fundamental social structural improvement is needed, rather than an
economic view of offsetting the cost of childbirth and child-rearing through an increase in
temporary disposable income to households. Alternatives should be considered to address
demographic issues such as the aging population and the late marriage of the younger
generation rather than using economic incentives.
Fundamentally, if people desire to have children, they are doing that, by getting
married, possibly at younger ages. The goal of increased childbirth is not the goal of the
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population in general. Only a change in people’s goals, or much more money than is currently
allocated, would have the intended effect.

8. Conclusion: limits of this analysis
The effects of childbirth grants, a policy aimed at raising the birth rate, were analyzed
based on data of 25 municipalities in Seoul Metropolitan City from 2015 to 2018 using panel
data analysis. The estimation shows the grants had a negative relation with childbirth, but the
real relationship is the reverse causality that lower birth rates lead to more grants.
However, this paper has limitations. First of all, it is a matter of generalization of the
analysis results in terms of the external validity. Seoul is the most urbanized place in Korea,
where active human and material resources are exchanged. Local areas have large effects (high
rho values in the estimation), so there is a limit to generalizing the results on a nationwide
because there are considerable fixed effects for each autonomous district.
Second, there is a problem of representativeness of variables and data. In reality, there
was a limit to collect relevant data when there were countless factors affecting childbirth
decisions, such as women's participation in economic activities, education levels and childcare
spending levels. This can be a factor that undermines the trustworthy causal relationship
between dependent and independent variables, the internal validity, of the analysis results.
The last is the limits of the data. There may be problems with accurate estimates of
panel data analysis because it was analyzed based on only four years of data, not enough timeaccumulated data. Other methods of estimation such as difference in difference which
compares data before and after the introduction of the childbirth grants, could be applied.
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From a fundamental policy perspective, the main conclusion is that Koreans do not
individually buy in to the policy of higher birth rates to a degree necessary to make this policy
successful.
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